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Rising income inequality is a global trend. Increased income
inequality has been associated with higher rates of crime, greater
consumer debt, and poorer health outcomes. The mechanisms
linking inequality to poor outcomes among individuals are poorly
understood. This research tested a behavioral account linking
inequality to individual decision making. In three experiments (n =
811), we found that higher inequality in the outcomes of an eco-
nomic game led participants to take greater risks to try to achieve
higher outcomes. This effect of unequal distributions on risk tak-
ing was driven by upward social comparisons. Next, we estimated
economic risk taking in daily life using large-scale data from inter-
net searches. Risk taking was higher in states with greater income
inequality, an effect driven by inequality at the upper end of the
income distribution. Results suggest that inequality may promote
poor outcomes, in part, by increasing risky behavior.
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Rising income inequality is a global trend in the 21st century(1). Nations and states with higher levels of economic in-
equality tend to have higher rates of self-defeating decision making
related to money, including crime (2), gambling (3), and greater
consumer debt (4). Inequality is also associated with social and
health problems, including higher rates of violence, drug use, and
shorter life expectancies (5–7). Among economically developed
countries, effects of inequality remain substantial after controlling
for median income levels, suggesting that inequality in the distri-
bution of income has unique effects distinct from individual income
levels. Given the historically high levels of income inequality in
many countries, understanding the effects of inequality is a central
concern across the social and medical sciences. Despite its im-
portance, the mechanisms linking inequality to the behaviors and
outcomes of individuals remain poorly understood. We tested a
behavioral explanation for why people may have poorer outcomes
in more unequal places, drawing on evolutionary theory regarding
risk preferences and psychological research on social comparisons.
We hypothesized that higher inequality leads to riskier behavior, in
part, through social comparison processes.
Research on social comparison demonstrates that people look to
others to judge their own standing on important dimensions, es-
pecially when objective standards are lacking (8, 9). One important
dimension on which people compare is financial resources. Al-
though money provides an objective metric for income, no objective
standard exists for judging how much one needs to be satisfied.
Relative comparisons have long been theorized to be important
factors shaping satisfaction with one’s income (10). Consistent
with this idea, one study of 16,000 workers found that relative
income compared with others in one’s workplace predicted job
satisfaction and quitting rates better than absolute income (11).
Experimental studies have likewise found that participants were
more satisfied with earnings when the amount was higher than a
comparison group, even when the amount of money earned was
held constant (11). Holding one’s own income constant, individ-
uals are less satisfied with their income if they have wealthier
neighbors (12) and if the typical pay in their occupation is higher
(13). This evidence suggests that upward comparison to those with
more income generally leads people to feel they need more to be
satisfied, whereas downward comparisons lead people to feel
satisfied with less (14).
Perceived need has a precise relationship to risk taking. Risk is
defined as the variance in decision outcomes (i.e., high-risk deci-
sions have a high potential reward but also a high potential for
loss). Developed to explain animal foraging behavior, Risk Sen-
sitivity Theory (RST) argues that when an animal’s caloric energy
intake is high, it will be risk-averse, preferring low-risk/low-reward
foraging options. As its energy budget declines, it becomes risk-
seeking, preferring high-risk/high-reward options (15, 16). Humans
also conform to predictions of RST. In experimental gambles, as the
minimum level of points needed to earn a monetary reward increases,
subjects becomemore likely to take a high-risk/high-reward gamble to
achieve the necessary points (17–19). Field studies suggest similar
patterns outside the laboratory. In professional football, as the yards
needed to reach a first down increase, teams become more likely to
choose a high-risk pass over a safer running play (20).
In humans, perceptions of need may be influenced not only by
material resources but also by subjective factors and relative
comparisons and, therefore, by inequality. Authors sometimes use
“inequality” to describe the effects of individual poverty or relative
disadvantage, which refer to an individual’s resources or position.
In contrast, we use the term inequality to describe the variance in
an income distribution (as is measured using metrics such as the
Gini coefficient). Thus, two individuals with identical incomes may
experience different levels of inequality if they are in contexts (i.e.,
nations, states, cities, or situations) with different levels of variance
in the income distributions. The distinction between poverty and
inequality is important because epidemiological evidence suggests
that higher inequality is associated with poorer outcomes even for
individuals with average incomes (5, 7).
Past research on objective income has found that the poor
tend to be risk-averse because they have little margin for error or
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loss (21, 22). In contrast, relative disadvantage compared with
others tends to increase risk taking, as individuals strive to catch
up to their comparison standards (23–25). In one study, partic-
ipants were tested in pairs. One member of each pair was given
$10 and the other was given nothing, and then both subjects
completed a series of gambling decisions to earn money. When
the disparity was known to subjects, the disadvantaged subjects
made riskier gambles than the advantaged subjects. But the
difference was eliminated when subjects did not know about the
disparity, suggesting that it was the knowledge of relative dis-
advantage rather than resources driving the effect (24).
When inequality in a distribution increases but one’s own po-
sition is unchanged, one could in principle compare upward or
downward with opposing effects. Empirically, however, social
comparisons in the domain of financial resources display an im-
portant asymmetry: Upward social comparisons are weighted
more heavily than are downward social comparisons (26, 27).
Because of this psychological asymmetry favoring upward com-
parison, we predicted that people would focus on increases among
the wealthy and neglect decreases among the poor. Inequality may
therefore function much like relative disadvantage, even when
one’s own position has not changed. As a result, increases in in-
equality are expected to have the same behavioral effects on
perceived needs as if everyone else were getting richer.
Considering both RST and asymmetric social comparisons, we
predicted that inequality would increase risk taking. Specifically,
we reasoned that (i) individuals make primarily upward compar-
isons to determine their need level, (ii) such upward comparisons
imply a higher comparison standard under high inequality than
low inequality, and (iii) people take higher risks as their perceived
need increases. Therefore, we hypothesized that individuals may
take greater risks as inequality rises. We tested this hypothesis in
three experiments. In addition to experimental findings, we ex-
amined whether geographical differences in inequality are asso-
ciated with greater risk taking as our hypothesis implies. We
estimated the prevalence of risk taking in each state using the
frequency of internet search terms reflecting financially risky be-
havior and tested the hypothesis that states with higher income
inequality would have greater risk-taking tendencies.
Study 1
To test the hypothesis that social comparison increases perceived
monetary need, we conducted an experiment in which partici-
pants learned about a gambling task and received information
about how much money previous players of the same game had
earned on average. Inequality was manipulated by showing
participants a distribution of previous players’ earnings, sepa-
rated into three groups (the top third, middle third, and bottom
third; see Fig. 1). In the low-inequality condition, the top third
earned only modestly more than the bottom third, whereas the
difference was larger in the high-inequality condition. Average
earnings were equated across conditions. This experimental
paradigm allows us to isolate the effect of inequality independent
of average income. Thus, the only difference between the high-
inequality and low-inequality conditions was the variance.
Participants were asked to indicate their perceived need by
answering, “What is the minimum amount of money you would
need to win in order to feel satisfied with your performance in
the Decision Game?” Next, subjects were given the opportunity
to make three gambles to earn real money. Each gamble allowed
five options that ranged from low risk/low reward (e.g., 90%
chance to win $0.28, 10% chance of winning nothing) to high
risk/high reward (e.g., 5% chance to win $5.00, 95% chance of
winning nothing). The options were equated in expected value
and differed only in risk (i.e., outcome variance). Risky decisions
were measured as the average probability of losing, averaged
across the three gambles.
To confirm that participants perceived the high-inequality
condition as more unequal, we collected pilot data (n = 222) in
which we manipulated inequality of outcomes and measured
perceived inequality as a manipulation check. We also measured
subjective relative deprivation—the feeling of resentment that
others have more than oneself. Although resources did not vary
objectively across conditions, participants may have felt sub-
jectively deprived in the high-inequality condition. Finally, we
measured perceived need using the item described above. The
pilot study confirmed higher perceived inequality (on a scale from
1 to 5) in the high-inequality condition (mean = 4.14, SD = 0.68)
than in the low-inequality condition (mean = 2.83, SD = 0.40),
t(220) = 17.44, P < 0.001. Subjective relative deprivation was also
slightly higher in the high-inequality condition (mean = 2.62, SD =
0.68) than the low-inequality condition (mean = 2.42, SD = 0.58),
t(220) = 2.35, P = 0.020, although the effect was much larger on
inequality (R2 = 0.58) than on relative deprivation (R2 = 0.03). As
predicted, perceived need was higher in the high-inequality con-
dition (mean = $0.82, SD = $0.48) than the low-inequality con-
dition (mean = $0.68, SD = $0.46), t(218) = 2.20, P < 0.05.
Perceived need was associated with perceived inequality, r = 0.28,
P < 0.001 but not with relative deprivation, r = 0.07, P = 0.33.
These analyses suggest that the manipulation was effective.
In the main study (n = 221), we manipulated inequality using the
same materials as the pilot study, measured perceived need, and
participants made gambling decisions. As predicted, the high-
inequality group expressed higher perceived need (mean = $0.76,
SD = $0.50) than the low-inequality group (mean = $0.61, SD =
$0.34), t(218) = 2.59, P = 0.01 (see Fig. 2). Moreover, inequality
increased risky gambling decisions, with a higher probability of losing
in the high-inequality condition (mean = 0.51, SD = 0.24) than in the
low-inequality condition (mean = 0.44, SD = 0.24), t(219) = 2.21, P =
0.028. Perceived need was significantly associated with risk taking, r =
0.19, P= 0.004. Bootstrapping analyses indicated a significant indirect
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Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the low-inequality and high-inequality
conditions in study 1.
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Fig. 2. Perceived need and risk preference as a function of inequality in
study 1. Columns reflect means, and error bars reflect SEs.
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effect of inequality on risk taking, mediated by perceived need, B =
0.03, SEB = 0.02, 95% CI = 0.01, 0.07. Higher inequality in the
distribution led to riskier decisions via its effects on perceived need.
Study 2
Because the effect of unequal distributions on risk taking is a central
finding, we replicated the effect in a separate sample. This study
used a within-subjects manipulation of inequality in which subjects
(n = 107) played 30 trials of the gambling game. Each trial included
a bar graph depicting the level of inequality of outcomes in each
game. These graphs were similar to the graphs presented in study 1.
The games had three levels of inequality (high, medium, and low).
Subjects indicated their gambles for each game by moving a sliding
scale from “low risk/low reward” to “high risk/high reward.” The
position on the sliding scale was recorded on a scale from 1 to 100,
although the participants did not see the numeric labels. This design
avoided using numeric labels on either the distribution graphs or the
sliding scale. We can thus be more confident that the effects were
driven by preferences regarding the balance of risk and reward, as
opposed to anchoring on any specific numeric values.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, subjects chose the riskiest options in
the high-inequality condition, mean = 70.14, SD = 28.23, with
intermediate risk in the medium-inequality condition, mean =
65.48, SD = 20.70, and the least risk in the low-inequality con-
dition, mean = 56.24, SD = 31.41, F(2, 212) = 8.88, P < 0.001. As
inequality of outcomes increased, risk taking increased linearly,
replicating the finding of study 1.
Study 3
We hypothesized that high inequality increases risk taking because
participants selectively compare with the high earners and neglect
the low earners. To test this mechanism directly, we measured the
social comparisons participants made. A standard way to measure
upward or downward social comparison is to provide subjects with
an opportunity to learn information about other people’s char-
acteristics and let them choose which they prefer to see (28). In a
first round of the gambling game, participants (n = 261) played
10 trials in which earning distributions were shown as in Fig. 1, but
the high and low bars of the distribution were hidden. Participants
could choose to see either the high or the low bar before making
their gambling decision, which provided a measure of preferences
for upward or downward comparisons. Next, participants com-
pleted a second round of gambling in which they saw the full
distributions. We examined the gambling decisions from the sec-
ond round as the dependent variable. Our account predicts that (i)
participants will display an overall preference for upward com-
parisons and (ii) individuals with the strongest preference for
upward comparisons will respond to inequality by increasing their
risk taking the most.
This design also provides a test of an alternative explanation
for our findings. Research on “last place aversion” suggests that
although people dislike low status in general, they are especially
averse to being in last place. Kuziemko et al. found that partic-
ipants who were in the last position in an earnings distribution
took riskier gambles than in other positions in an effort to move
out of last place (29). High inequality could motivate riskier
gambles because of a desire to avoid the lower extremes of the
high-inequality distribution (i.e., “last place”) rather than the
desire to achieve the higher extremes. If so, then high inequality
should increase risky decisions primarily among individuals who
make downward comparisons to those in the lowest position.
Thus, our upward comparison hypothesis and the last place
aversion hypothesis make opposing predictions.
As expected, participants chose more upward comparisons,
mean = 63%, than downward comparisons, mean = 37%, t(260) =
11.36, P < 0.001. The proportion of upward comparisons was
significantly greater than chance (50%), t(260) = 5.97, P < 0.001.
We tested whether participants’ comparisons moderated the ef-
fects of inequality on risk taking using a mixed-model ANOVA (see
Fig. 4). Replicating the previous experiments, participants made
riskier gambles when inequality was high rather than low, as
reflected in a significant main effect of inequality, F(1, 259) = 7.19,
P = 0.008. This effect was qualified by an interaction between in-
equality and upward comparisons, F(1, 259) = 63.50, P < 0.001.
Among participants who made more upward comparisons (1 SD
above the mean), their gambles were much riskier on high-
inequality trials (mean = 81.70, 95% CI = 77.90, 85.50) than low-
inequality trials (mean = 58.86, 95% CI = 54.45, 63.27). Participants
at the mean of upward comparison also made significantly riskier
decisions on high-inequality trials (mean = 68.26, 95% CI = 65.57,
70.95) than low-inequality trials (mean = 62.52, 95% CI = 59.41,
65.64). Among participants who made the lowest number of upward
comparisons (1 SD below the mean), gambles were riskier on low-
inequality trials (mean = 66.19, 95% CI = 61.78, 70.60) than high-
inequality trials (54.83, 95% CI = 51.02, 58.64).
This pattern is inconsistent with last place aversion as an ex-
planation for these findings because participants who compared
downward did not take more risks in the high-inequality condition
to avoid the worst outcome. Instead, they took fewer risks. The
observed pattern is consistent with the upward comparison expla-
nation, because increased risk taking in high-inequality conditions
was driven by the majority of subjects who compared upward.
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Fig. 3. Risk preference as a function of inequality in study 2. Columns re-
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Study 4
The experimental findings reported above have the advantage of
experimental control and the ability to draw conclusions about
causality. However, a limitation of such experiments is that they
may not reflect how inequality and risk taking operate in ev-
eryday life. Data on risky behavior are difficult to collect because
people often underreport risky behaviors on surveys. To obtain a
more objective measure of risk taking in daily life, we used data
from Google.com to measure the frequencies of search terms
reflecting monetary risk taking.
The search data included all Google searches since 2004, by
state. We generated four a priori search terms deemed to reflect
efforts to acquire money or goods without regard for risk or loss:
“pay day loans,” “lottery,” “win money,” and “no down payment.”
To increase the reliability of the risk-taking index, we also included
the four searches most highly correlated with each term, which
were generally alternate spellings or phrasings of the same terms.
This created a risk-taking index including 20 search terms with high
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95). To control for the possibility
that high-risk searches were driven by searches for ways to earn
money in general, we created a second list of search terms
expected, a priori, to reflect low-risk strategies for financial gain.
The search terms were “savings,” “invest,” “retirement account,”
and “pay off debt.”We validated these terms in an online survey to
ensure that the terms were perceived as searches for high-risk ac-
tivities and low-risk activities, respectively (Materials and Methods).
To test the main hypothesis that higher inequality increases
risk taking, we compared estimates of risk taking with measures
of economic inequality across states. First, we examined the as-
sociation between the risk-taking index and Gini statistics for
each state. As displayed in Fig. 5A, states with higher Gini co-
efficients tended to have higher values on the risk index, r = 0.57,
P < 0.001. This association remained significant when controlling
for median income in a regression analysis, β = 0.49, t = 4.30, P <
0.001. Inequality also tends to be higher in states with larger
populations, r = 0.52, and greater population density, r = 0.36.
To control for these factors, we included population and density
(population per square mile) as control variables. The associa-
tion between the Gini coefficient and risk taking remained sig-
nificant, β = 0.40, t = 2.42, P = 0.02 (see SI Appendix for
complete regression tables).
The Gini coefficient does not distinguish between inequality
driven by greater wealth among the wealthy versus inequality
driven by greater poverty among the poor. Our hypothesis that
upward social comparisons motivate more risky behaviors than
downward social comparisons suggests that inequality at the top
of the distribution will predict risky searches better than in-
equality at the bottom of the distribution. We examined the ratio
between income at the 90th percentile and the 50th percentile to
estimate the contribution of inequality at the top of the distri-
bution. To estimate the contribution of inequality at the low end
of the distribution, we examined the ratio between the 50th
percentile and the 10th percentile. As displayed in Fig. 5, the risk
index was significantly associated with the 90/50 ratio, r = 0.57,
P < 0.001 (Fig. 5B), but was not significantly associated with the
50/10 ratio, r = 0.24, P = 0.09 (Fig. 5C). When both ratios were
entered in a regression model to estimate their unique contri-
butions, the 90/50 ratio was a significant predictor, β = 0.74, t =
4.63, P < 0.001, and the 50/10 ratio was not, β = –0.25, t = 1.60,
P = 0.12. The 90/50 ratio remained a significant predictor when
population and population density were included as covariates,
β = 0.88, t = 4.97, P < 0.001.
An alternative explanation for these associations is that in-
equality encourages people to focus on gaining money in general
but not to use more risky strategies. Contrary to that explanation,
higher Gini coefficients were associated with fewer low-risk
searches, r = –0.47, P < 0.001. The 90/50 ratio was also associ-
ated with fewer low-risk searches, r = –0.53, P < 0.001. When
median income, population, and population density were included
as controls, the 90/50 ratio remained significant, β = –0.63, t =
3.51, P = 0.001, but Gini did not, β = –0.32, t = 1.72, P = 0.09 (see
SI Appendix for full models). The relationship between inequality
and risk taking cannot be explained by greater interest in financial
gain in general. Rather, inequality appears to be linked specifically
to high-risk, high-reward searches.
The social comparison mechanism posited by our account
requires that people must have some awareness of the inequality
around them. Although people cannot directly observe other
people’s bank balances, people often signal their wealth using
status goods, which display wealth and status to others (also
called positional goods or conspicuous consumption) (30–32).
To test whether the visibility of status goods links income in-
equality to risk taking, we estimated the prevalence of status
goods in each state. We used data from previous research that
found that states with higher inequality generated more Google
searches for status goods (33). We used the published survey
data to identify search terms for goods that most reliably com-
municated status, and we created an index of 10 search terms for
status goods. If the prevalence of status goods signals inequality
that enables social comparison, then searches for status goods
should account for some of the shared variance between in-
equality and risk taking. We used bootstrapping to test whether
the association between inequality and risk taking was statisti-
cally mediated by the prevalence of status goods.
We estimated a model using the Gini coefficient to measure
inequality and included median income, population, and pop-
ulation density as covariates. Replicating prior research (33), we
found that inequality was associated with more searches for status
goods, B = 0.65, SEB = 0.11, P < 0.001 (see Fig. 6). Status goods
searches were, in turn, associated with more risky searches, B =
0.84, SEB = 0.18, P < 0.001. The indirect effect of inequality on
risky searches via status goods was significant, B = 0.55, SEB = 0.15,
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Fig. 5. Associations between inequality and risk-related search queries. Inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient (A), the 90/50 income ratio (B), and
the 50/10 ratio (C). Risk index is a standardized measure of the frequency of Google search terms across 50 states.
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95% CI = 0.31, 0.94. After accounting for the indirect path, the
direct path from inequality to risk taking was no longer significant,
B = –0.22, SEB = 0.18, P = 0.23. Results are the same if the
90/50 ratio is used rather than Gini coefficient (see SI Appendix for
complete analyses). Although these data are correlational, the
pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that displays of status
goods mediate the association between inequality and risk taking.
This suggests that the perception of inequality is critical, consistent
with the social comparison account.
Discussion
Our results suggest that inequality increases risk taking because
individuals selectively make upward social comparisons. As a
result, higher inequality has the same behavioral effects as if
everyone else were earning more. Such upward comparisons
increase perceived needs, and people are willing to take greater
risks to meet those needs. These findings shed light on a pathway
by which macroeconomic inequality may affect the behaviors and
outcomes of individuals.
This evidence suggests that inequality in an income distribu-
tion (i.e., variance) can influence risky behavior independent of
one’s own resources and relative standing. Risky behaviors such
as crime and gambling have long been associated with poverty
and relative deprivation. However, epidemiological evidence
suggests that even after controlling for individual resources,
places with more unequal distributions also have poorer eco-
nomic, health, and social outcomes (2–7). Our findings suggest
that the effects of inequality reflect not only structural economic
forces but also behavioral responses to unequal economic con-
texts. An implication of these findings is that high-inequality
contexts may breed inequality in outcomes, as choosing high-
risk options will lead to large gains for a few individuals but
losses for most. This may provide a mechanism by which in-
equality becomes self-perpetuating.
Upward comparisons may occur either by direct comparisons
to the very rich or by indirect comparisons, as in “expenditure
cascades.” Frank (34) has argued that people compare them-
selves to those adjacent to them in social position. When the
extremely rich become wealthier, the “merely rich” may feel less
satisfied and increase their consumption. The middle class then
follows suit and so on. Consistent with the cascade interpreta-
tion, some research suggests that people prefer to compare
themselves to others who are similar to them (28). However,
these studies rely largely on self-reports about whom respon-
dents compare themselves with, and they may reflect lay theories
about social comparison. Experimental studies that present re-
spondents with extreme comparison standards (e.g., Michael
Jordan for the dimension of athletic ability; models for attrac-
tiveness) find that such extreme comparisons lower participants’
satisfaction with their own status on those dimensions (35–37).
Future research should investigate whether the effects of in-
equality on risk taking are driven by direct comparisons to the
extremely rich or by indirect cascades of social comparisons.
Our studies focused on financial risk taking, which may be re-
lated to economic outcomes such as crime, gambling, and debt.
Other outcomes associated with inequality, such as health prob-
lems, may be linked to risky health behaviors such as smoking,
substance use, and unhealthy eating. Behavioral decisions in these
domains pit hedonic rewards against long-term health risks (38).
Health-risk behavior may be linked to economic inequality
through at least two routes. First, risk-taking across different do-
mains tends to be positively correlated (39). Inequality could in-
fluence multiple outcomes through a general “syndrome” of risky
behavior across domains. Alternatively, inequality may affect dis-
tinct domains of risk via separate pathways. For instance, the
display of status goods may affect people’s comparison standards
for how much pleasure other people experience. If so, upward
comparison on hedonic experience may lead to increased risk
taking related to hedonic experiences, such as substance use or
unhealthy foods. Future research should examine the mechanisms
linking inequality to nonmonetary risk taking.
Income inequality has been rising in many advanced market
economies for decades. Globally, the wealthiest 1% own nearly
as much as the poorest 99% (40). In America, the wealthiest
0.1% of Americans control as much wealth as the bottom 90%
(1). The strong associations between income inequality and poor
outcomes raise fundamental questions about the relationship
between economic systems and the well-being of individuals in
those systems. Our research suggests that risky decision making
may be one pathway by which inequality affects outcomes. Rising
inequality may change what individuals consider to be enough,
and therefore the risks they are willing to take to gain more.
Materials and Methods
Participants for studies 1–3 were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk,
and the experimental tasks were completed online. Minimum sample sizes
for each experiment were set at n = 100 per between-subjects condition.
This provides high power (0.89) assuming a “medium”-sized effect (d = 0.5)
and adequate power (0.74) assuming a “small” effect (d = 0.25) for
between-groups comparisons. The same sample size in study 2 provides high
power (0.99) for within-subjects comparisons assuming a “small” effect. All
experiments were approved by the Internal Review Board (IRB) at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Before participating, all subjects
documented their consent using an online consent form approved by
the IRB.
Study 1. The gambling task instructions were used to manipulate inequality.
The instructions read, “The game is called the Decision Game. You will win
money based on the decisions you make in this game. Many people have
played the Decision Game and the computer program automatically updates
the outcomes of the game as people play.” The distribution displaying in-
equality was presented both in text and a bar graph (see Fig. 1).
In the pilot study, we measured perceived inequality using three items:
“Does the top 1/3 of previous players have a lot more, slightly more, or no
more money than the other players?” Ratings were made on a 5-point scale
from 1 (no more) to 5 (a lot more). “Does the bottom 1/3 of previous players
have a lot less, slightly less, or no less money than the other players?” (1 = no
less; 5 = a lot less; reverse scored). “How unequal are the past players’
outcomes in the game?” (1 = not at all unequal; 5 = extremely unequal). We
measured subjective relative deprivation using four items from a published
measure of subjective relative deprivation (19) (e.g., “I feel dissatisfied with
what I have compared with what previous players have”). The wording
was modified to refer to other players in the game rather than people in
general.
Study 1 measured perceived need by asking, “What is the minimum
amount of money you would need to win in order to feel satisfied with your
performance in the Decision Game?” Responses could range from $0.00 to
$2.50. We also measured perceived aspirations using the item, “What is the
highest amount of money you realistically hope to win in the Decision
Game?” The results using the perceived need item are reported here, but
results are unchanged if both need and aspirations are averaged together
into a composite.
The following three lotteries were used to measure risk taking in study 1.
Lottery1:
1) 5% chance of winning $3.00/95% chance of winning $0.00;
2) 35% chance of winning $0.43/65% chance of winning $0.00;
3) 50% chance of winning $0.30/50% chance of winning $0.00;
4) 65% chance of winning $0.23/35% chance of winning $0.00;
5) 95% chance of winning $0.16/5% chance of winning $0.00.
Gini Risk index
Status goods
B = .55* (-.22)
Fig. 6. Association between inequality and risk-related searches is medi-
ated by searches for status goods.
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Lottery2:
1) 20% chance of winning $1.00/80% chance of winning $0.00;
2) 40% chance of winning $0.50/60% chance of winning $0.00;
3) 50% chance of winning $0.40/50% chance of winning $0.00;
4) 60% chance of winning $0.33/40% chance of winning $0.00;
5) 80% chance of winning $0.25/20% chance of winning $0.00.
Lottery3:
1) 10% chance of winning $2.50/90% chance of winning $0.00;
2) 30% chance of winning $0.83/70% chance of winning $0.00;
3) 50% chance of winning $0.50/50% chance of winning $0.00;
4) 70% chance of winning $0.36/30% chance of winning $0.00;
5) 90% chance of winning $0.28/10% chance of winning $0.00.
Study 2. Subjects in study 2 played 30 lotteries and were told that their
payment would be based on one randomly selected game. The degree of
inequality in the outcomes for each game was manipulated by displaying a
bar graph. The three levels of inequality (10 trials each) were varied from trial
to trial in a randomly ordered sequence. The gambling decision was indicated
by sliding a cursor scale along a line in which the left side was labeled low risk/
low reward, and the right side was labeled high risk/high reward.
Study 3. Subjects in study 3 completed the same repeated-measures gambling
task as in study 2. In a first block of 10 gambles, they saw only themiddle bar of
the earnings distribution and chose whether they wished to see the top or
bottom bar. Distributions in this block were not symmetrical, so that subjects
could not guess the height of one hidden bar from the height of the revealed
bar. In a secondblock of 10 gambles, participants saw the full distributions, with
either a high-inequality or low-inequality symmetrical distribution on each trial.
Study 4. Data for study 4 search queries were downloaded from Google
Trends (https://www.google.com/trends/correlate). Gini data and control
variables for each state were obtained from the US Census Bureau’s Amer-
ican Community Survey (ACS). The 90/50 and 50/10 ratios were constructed
by E. C. Truesdale and J. L. Herrera from census data using ACS based on
averages from 2010 to 2014. Data on lottery sales by state in 2015 were
obtained from the North American Association of State and Provincial Lot-
teries (https://www.statista.com/statistics/388238/sales-of-lotteries-by-state-us/).
Data for status goods searches are from Walasek and Brown (33). All data in
Study 4 are publicly available aggregate state-level data with no personally
identifying information. Subjects in their survey judged a series of search terms
for how clearly they conveyed status using “yes,” “no,” and “don’t know”
options. We used the 10 unique search terms that received the most “yes”
responses. The terms were “designer rain boots,” “Ralph Lauren,” “fur vests,”
“David Yurman rings,” “seersucker blazer,” “navy blazer,” “St Thomas Ritz,”
“well appointed house,” “bass loafers,” and “brown suede.” For redundant
terms (e.g., “Ralph Lauren” and “Ralph Lauren men’s”), only the most general
(e.g., “Ralph Lauren”) was retained.
To estimate financial risk taking, we first generated four a priori search
terms deemed to reflect efforts to make money or acquire goods without
regard for risk or loss: “pay day loans,” “lottery,” “win money,” and “no
down payment.” Next, to control for the possibility that these search terms
reflect searching for money-related websites regardless of risk, we de-
veloped a list of nonrisky money-related terms: “savings,” “invest,” “re-
tirement account,” and “pay off debt.” The search lists were validated by an
independent sample of raters naïve to the hypothesis (see SI Appendix,
Supplementary Materials S1).
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